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WEBCASTER H: A CASE STUDY OF
BUSINESS TO BUSINESS RATE
SETTING BY FORMAL RULEMAKING
Andrew D. Stephenson *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (the Act) of 2004
is unsuccessful at achieving its goal of an effective administrative system
for determining copyright royalty rates between the private parties that
make up copyright owners and copyright users.' In particular, the Act fails
to create an environment that promotes efficient rate-setting and does not
encourage private negotiation as intended by Congress. This note will
focus on the Copyright Royalty Board's rate-setting in the proceeding,
coined Webcaster II, announced February 16, 2005,2 the final rule and
order determined on May 1, 2007,3 and the subsequent decision of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals issued on August 7, 2009.' The Webeaster II
proceedings covered rate-setting for the period beginning January 1, 2006,
and ending on December 31, 2010.'
The Act was the product of ongoing legislative efforts to reform the
federal regulatory process.6 Federal agencies are authorized to issue
regulations (in this case, rate-setting) by their enabling statutes.7 Most
regulations are issued informally under the notice-and-comment procedure
established by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Less commonly,
rate-setting systems, like that under the Act, go beyond notice-and-
comment by increasing the involvement of private parties under the
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Class of 2011.
1. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341
(2004); H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 18 (2004).
2. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed. Reg.
7,970 (Feb. 16, 2005).
3. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg.
24,084 (May 1, 2007).
4. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
5. Digital Performance Right, 70 Fed. Reg. at 7,970.
6. See, e.g., ROGELIo GARCIA, CONG. REs. SERVICE, FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN
OVERVIEW 2 (May 2001).
7. id. at 1.
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premise that such a change would facilitate and encourage private
settlement agreements for determining royalty rates.
To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Act in the context of
Webcaster II, this note begins with background in Parts II and III which
discuss the legislative history of the Act, including the rationale behind the
administrative rate-setting structure, and the economic rationale behind
using an administrative system for copyright royalties. Part IV includes a
history of the rate-setting process in the Webcaster II proceedings. Part V
will then analyze the failings of the system.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Prior to the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act, the
Librarian of Congress was empowered to convene Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panels ("CARPs") to determine copyright royalty rates whenever
private negotiation among affected parties failed to establish rates.' The
CARP system suffered from being inconsistent, unnecessarily expensive,
and the arbitrators lacked appropriate expertise to render decisions."o
Additionally, legislators were unhappy with CARP determinations and
believed that the rates were overly burdensome on copyright users."
The Act replaced the CARPs with the permanent Copyright Royalty
Board ("Board").' 2 The Board is comprised of three administrative law
judges, known as the Copyright Royalty Judges, appointed by the Librarian
of Congress.' 3 The extent of its authorization is to make determinations of
binding copyright royalty rates and to publish those rates in the Federal
Register.14  The rates set by the Board are constrained by policy
requirements to maximize the availability of creative works to the public,
afford copyright owners a fair return for the creative work and copyright
users a fair income, and to minimize the disruptive impact of royalty
disputes.'" Additionally, the determined rates are required to represent the
terms that would have been negotiated by willing buyers and willing
sellers.'6
Typically, administrative boards are delegated with the authority to
adopt regulations and establish rates as a means of governing industry
8. H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 24.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 18.
10. Id
I1. See, e.g., Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780
(2002).
12. 37 C.F.R. § 301.1 (2007).
13. 17 U.S.C. §801 (2007). This method of appointment raises certain constitutional Appointment
Clause concerns that have been noted by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
14. 17 U.S.C. §801(b)(1) (2007).
15. 17 U.S.C. 1§I14(f)(2)(B), 112 e) (2007).
16. 17 U.S.C. §114(f)(3), §112 (e)(5) (2007).
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sectors that change rapidly in a dynamic economy. Legislative power may
be delegated to an administrative body where there is agreement that a task
must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature
without the assistance of outside authorities or the expenditure of effort so
great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business.17 The
Supreme Court has recognized that delegation to administrative boards
helps to ensure decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular
statute are made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of
the complexities of the subject that is entrusted to their administration.
Delegation is most commonly used where the industry sector to be
regulated is highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of
continuous decision." Boards are able to adjust regulations and rates
within their policy constraints as the realities of the industry sector change
more quickly than statutory controls established by legislatures.
The policy decision to restrain businesses, particularly in rate-setting,
reflects an interest in the public at large deciding what prices "ought" to
be.20 In recent years, the administrative determination of what prices
"ought" to be is being replaced by processes that are designed to simulate
private contracting.2 1 The rationale for transitioning to systems which
emphasize competitive markets in traditionally regulated industries is
economic welfare theory.22 The economic welfare theory suggests that
prices developed through competitive markets and private contracting
ought to be those that make the system economically efficient.2 3 The
system established by the Copyright Royalty Distribution and Reform Act
is consistent with this understanding of economic welfare theory by
encouraging private contract negotiation between entities in regulated
sectors while maintaining a regulatory backstop.24 However, liberalized
rate-setting schemes, like that of the Copyright Royalty Board, require
modifications and adjustments to improve implementation due to the fact
that rate-setting has been such an established feature in certain markets that
there is only a very general understanding of the true, underlying
competitive structure. 25
As a result of the Act, the Copyright Royalty Board's authority to set
statutory payment rates between market participants is significantly
17. LOuis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 35, 37 (1965).
18. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945).
19. Id.
20. Charles G. Stalon, Regulating in Pursuit of Efficient and Just Prices, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
913, 914-915 (1995).
21. JIM Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (2005).
22. Stalon, supra note 20, at 915.
23. Id
24. Kenneth Burton & Dennis Swann, Regulatory Reform: The Way Forward, in THE AGE OF
REGULATORY REFORM 321 (Kenneth Burton & Dennis Swann eds., 1989).
25. Id at 324.
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constrained as a result of the willing buyer-willing seller standard and the
supremacy of private agreements. Rate-setting reflects a policy decision by
the administrative body.26 Here, the policy decision is how to maximize the
availability of creative works to the public and to afford the copyright
owner an undefined fair return for his or her creative work.27 However, the
Act declared that private negotiation between copyright owners and
copyright users for determining royalty rates and establishing distribution
of royalties is the desired outcome.28 Thus, the Board's policy decision is
complicated by the policy goal of creating a private market for copyrighted
materials. Under the system, license agreements negotiated between
copyright owners and webcasters, at any time, even after the Judges' rate-
setting determinations become final, shall be given effect in lieu of any
determination of the Board.29 By facilitating and encouraging settlement
agreements for determining royalty rates, the Act aims to reduce the need
to conduct full-fledged rate-setting and distribution proceedings and
encourage the development of a private market.3 0
As part of the effort to move away from administrative rate-making to
a private market, the Copyright Royalty Judges serve more as common law
judges than agency regulators advancing rate proposals of the Board's own
design. 3' The Judges preside over adversarial, on-the-record litigation
between copyright owners and users, in which each participant attempts to
prove that its own proposed rates and terms best satisfy the statutory
standard.32 Copyright owners and users attempt to prove the value of the
property interest at stake. The Judges are put in the position of fact finder
of the property value of the copyrighted works. They are required to make
their determinations based solely on the basis of the factual record
developed through the adversary process and may not enter material into
the record using administrative notice, thereby limiting the effective and
efficient use of their own expertise.33 The Judges have neither the authority
nor the responsibility to address matters beyond the record assembled in the
proceedings.34
26. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 15 (1947).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A), (B) (2007).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 24.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3), § 112 (e)(5) (2007).
30. Id.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 803(c) (2007); 37 C.F.R. § 351, et seq. (2007); Brief for Appellee at 25,
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 574 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No.
07-I1123).
32. See generally 17 U.S.C. §803(b) (2007); 37 C.F.R. § 351 (2007).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(3) (2007).
34. Brief for Appellee at 25, 574 F.3d 748.
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III. BACKGROUND AND ECONOMICS OF
STATUTORY LICENSES FOR WEBCASTING
From November 2007 until February 2008, the Writers Guild of
America staged a strike against Hollywood studios." The strike lasted
three months at a collective cost to the industry of two billion dollars.
The sole issue in the dispute was when and how revenues from Internet and
other digital transmissions of the writers' work would be allocated. 7 While
writers are not the exact equivalent of composers and performers of
musical works, the desire to protect their right to payment for
dissemination of intangible assets over digital media is similar. The writers
resorted to extreme measures to secure through private contract with the
studios what they considered to be a fair return when their work is
disseminated though digital transmissions.
The modem music industry is one of the larger consumer markets in
the world with digital music sales amounting to $4.2 billion in 2009."
Commercial webcasting is an industry growing in popularity." Internet
webcasters play to an audience ranging from 51 million to 70 million
listeners per month.4 0  As webcasting business models develop, the
webcasting industry has experienced increased profitability.41 The industry
generated $500 million in advertising revenue in 2006, a ten-fold increase
from 2003.42
In the United States, the music industry is heavily dependent on
statutory licenses.43 Statutory licenses permit copyright users, upon
compliance with the statutory conditions of the license, to transmit the
musical work without obtaining consent from, or negotiating license fees
with, the copyright owners. By protecting the rights of artists, composers,
and performers, copyright law has enabled copyright owners to control the
exploitation of their work and to earn rewards for their creations.4 4 The
35. Claudia Eller & Richard Verrier, And That's a Wrap! Walkout to End, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2008, at Cl.
36. Michael White & Andy Fixmer, Hollywood Writers Return to Work after Ending Strike,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid-aKdwR9oC54WM.
37. Id.
38. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 6
(2010), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/section resources/dmr2010.html.
39. Radio Broadcast Royalties: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the S. Comm. On Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Robert Kimball, Executive Vice President, RealNetworks, Inc.).
40. Paul Musser, The Internet Radio Equality Act: A Needed Substantive Cure for Webcasting
Royalty Standards and Congressional Bargaining Chip, 8 LOY. LAW & TECH. ANN. 1 (2009).
4 1. Id
42. Id
43. Mark A. Lemley & Pillip J.Weiser, Should Property of Liability Rules Govern Information?,
85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 825 (2007).
44. Ruth Towse, Copyright Policy, Cultural Policy and Support for Artists, in THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 66 (Wendy Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003).
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Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 created a statutory license in
performances disseminated by Internet broadcasters and provided a means
of payment to copyright owners.4 5 Internet broadcasting, or "webcasting,"
is the transmission of radio programming over the Internet or through
wireless networks as digital audio signals.46 Section 114 of Title 17 in the
United States Code ("Section 114") provides for statutory licenses and
grants of royalties to copyright owners for the digital public performance of
sound recordings.4 7 Statutory licenses under Section 112 of Title 17
("Section 112") cover the ephemeral, temporary copies of the copyrighted
work created to facilitate the transmission of sound recordings during
webcasting. 48
Copyright owners are represented by SoundExchange, Inc.
("SoundExchange") in matters involving Section 114 and Section 112
statutory licenses. 49  SoundExhange in a non-profit performance rights
organization designated as the sole entity to collect and distribute royalties
from digital transmissions of copyrighted work on behalf of featured and
non-featured recording artists, master rights owners (usually record labels),
and independent artists who record and own their masters. 0 Copyright
users subject to Section 114 and Section 112 statutory licenses are
represented by an assortment of groups with distinct interests. One such
group is the Digital Media Association ("DiMA") which is an advocacy
organization focused on creating a regulatory environment that enables
business model innovation for commercial webcasters."' Other interests
may be represented by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting or the
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System which primarily focuses on the
regulatory environment impacting not-for-profit, education focused
webcasters.52 Still others are represented by separate groups and
organizations.
The core of the dispute between copyright owners and copyright users
is how to set the rates and terms of the statutory licenses. SoundExchange
is most interested in a per-performance system of pricing that compensates
owners for every song played. In the Webcaster II proceedings,
SoundExchange sought monthly fees from commercial and non-
45. Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
46. Brief for Commercial Webcaster Appellants at 3, Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d 748.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2007).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2007); Beethoven.com, 394 F.3d at 942-43.
49. 37 C.F.R. § 262.4(b) (2007).
50. SoundExchange, SOUNDEXCHANGE.COM, http://soundexchange.com/about/ (last visited March
4, 2010).
51. About DiMA, DIGMEDIA.ORG, http://www.digmedia.org/index.php?option corn content&view
=article&id=87&Itemid=55 (last visited March 4, 2010).
52. About CPB, CPB.ORG, http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/ (last visited March 4, 2010);
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, http://www.ibsradio.org (last visited March 4, 2010).
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commercial webcasters equal to the greater of 30% of gross revenues or a
per-performance rate that doubles within five years.53 Commercial
webcasters, on the other hand, desire a percentage of revenue system in
order to protect against the possibility that the costs of the copyright
licenses would exceed revenues. Specifically, large commercial
webcasters sought license fees equal to 5.5% of gross revenues while small
commercial webcasters only wanted to pay 4% of gross revenues.5 4
Noncommercial webcasters, on the other hand, preferred a flat fee in order
to simplify their cost structures.
The rates and terms of statutory licenses affect the allocation of
musical works as a productive resource.56  The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has recognized that "billions of dollars and
fates of entire industries can ride on the Copyright Royalty Board's
decisions."57  The large volume of musical performances used by
webcasters results in a situation where fractions of a cent per performance
may make the difference between the viability of a commercial webcaster
or its demise. Nonetheless, copyright markets do not function well.5 9
Transaction costs to achieve optimal market behavior are extremely
burdensome for the disparate copyright owners and users.60 As a result, the
involved parties generally consider the imposition of statutory license rates
and a statutory scheme for payment and collection, enforceable by federal
law, to be beneficial." Most copyright users want unplanned, rapid, and
indemnified access to any and all of the repertory of copyrighted worked,
and the owners want a reliable method of collecting for the use of their
copyrights.62
In the absence of a statutory licensing system, copyright owners and
users would incur numerous transaction costs that could make webcasting
uneconomical. Eliminating or reducing transaction costs is the
conventional economic justification for statutory licensing because setting
a legislatively predetermined or administratively prescribed rate for
specific uses removes certain transaction costs as an element of copyright
53. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088, 24,090.
54. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088.
55. Id at 24,090.
56. William J. Baumel, The Socially Desirable Size of Copyright Fees, in RECENT TRENDS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT 175 (Ruth Towse & Richard Watt eds., 2008).
57. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh J.,
concurring).
58. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant Commercial Webcasters at 5, Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574
F.3d 748 (stating that the rates imposed by the Copyright Royalty Board will cripple even the most
successful webcasters).
59. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. Ray. 1600, 1613 (1982).
60. Id
61. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 21 (1979).
62. Id
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transactions.63 These transaction costs include: search costs-buyers and
sellers finding each other in increasingly broad and distributed markets;
information costs-learning about the products of sellers and the needs of
the buyers; negotiation costs-determining the terms of individual
agreements; decision costs-comparing the terms of the seller to other
sellers and vice versa; policing costs-buyers and sellers taking steps to
ensure that the goods or services and the terms under which the sale was
made are transformed into behavior; and enforcement costs-buyers and
sellers agreeing to remedies for incomplete performance. 64
IV. THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD SYSTEM AND
HOW THE PROCESS WORKED FOR WEBCASTER H
The Copyright Royalty Board begins its rate-setting proceedings by
publishing in the Federal Register a clear notice of the proceedings and
request for petitions to participate." The Board will determine each
petitioner's qualifications to participate in the proceedings. Unqualified
petitioners are those without significant interest in the proceeding.66 After
the window for submitting petitions to participate has closed, the Board
informs each qualified participant of all the other participants and requests
that participants engage in voluntary negotiation. 67  The voluntary
negotiation period lasts for three months.68  If the participating parties
report that a settlement has been reached by some or all of the parties, the
Copyright Royalty Board will publish the settlement in the Federal
Register for notice and comment from those parties bound by the terms,
rates, or other determination set by the agreement.69 At the close of the
voluntary negotiation period, the Board instructs participants to file written
direct statements and subsequent responses to the statements of opposing
participants. 70 Following the submission of written direct statements and
rebuttals, the Board determines a schedule for conducting and completing
discovery.71 Participants in royalty rate proceedings may request
nonprivileged documents from opposing participants that are directly
related to the written direct statement or written rebuttal statement of that
63. Robert P. Merges, 0fProperty Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2655, 2669 (1994)
64. Larry Downes, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION: HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES THAi GOVERN LIFE
AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b) (2007); Digital Performance Right, 70 Fed. Reg. 7,970.
66. 37 C.F.R. § 351.1(c) (2007).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)3) (2007).
6 8. Id.
69. 37 C.F.R. § 351.2(b) (2007).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(5) (2007); 37 C.F.R. §351.4 (2007).
7 1. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2007).
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participant.7 Broad, nonspecific discovery requests are not acceptable.
Participants are also limited to take no more than ten depositions and
secure responses to no more than twenty-five interrogatories.7 The
discovery period is limited to sixty days." A post-discovery settlement
conference is held among the participants within twenty-one days after the
close of discovery outside of the presence of the Copyright Royalty
Judges." In absence of a settlement, the Board will move on to hearings
that consist of opening statements by each party and testimony from
witnesses familiar with copyright ownership and use." The Board issues
its determination in the proceedings not later than eleven months after the
conclusion of the post-discovery settlement conference.78
Subsequent to the Board's determination, participants may file
motions to order a rehearing before the Board.79  The Board may grant a
rehearing upon a showing that any aspect of the determination may be
erroneous." Judicial review of the Board's determination is provided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should any
aggrieved participant appeal within thirty days of the publication of the
determination in the Federal Register." The Copyright Royalty Board
bears the initial responsibility for interpreting the statute.82 The Court of
Appeals is limited to assessing the reasonableness of the Board's
interpretation of the inherent ambiguity in the statute.83 The Court of
Appeals will uphold the results of adversarial agency proceedings unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or not supported by
substantial evidence.8 4 If the court determines that it will not uphold the
Board, it has the power to modify, vacate, or remand any portion of the
Board's determination." However, courts are particularly deferential to
administratively determined rates because of the highly technical nature of
administrative proceedings.86
Forty-two parties filed motions to participate in the Webcaster II
proceedings, but the Board reduced that number to twenty-eight after it
72. 37 C.F.R. § 351.5(b) (2007).
73. Id
74. Id.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(iv) (2007).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(x) (2007); 37 C.F.R. § 351.7 (2007).
77. 37 C.F.R. § 351.9 (2007).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(1) (2007).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(2) (2007).
80. 37 C.F.R. § 353.1 (2007).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2007).
82. Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d at 757.
83. Id
84. Id at 755; 5U.S.C.§(706(2) (2007).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (2007).
86. Id (citing E. Ky. Power Coop. v. FERC 489 F.3d 1299, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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determined the qualifications of each potential participant." Broadly, the
participants can be defined as either copyright owners or copyright users.
Copyright owners were represented in the proceedings by SoundExchange,
the entity that has been appointed by the Copyright Royalty Board to be the
sole entity to collect and distribute digital performance royalties.
Copyright users were Internet webcasters or broadcast radio simulcasters
that employ streaming technology.8 9 These users comprised a range of
different business models and programming, 9 0 and were further classified
by the Board as commercial webcasters (e.g., DiMA) and noncommercial
webcasters (e.g. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting).9'
The voluntary negotiation period proved to be unsuccessful. 92 The
Board ordered the participants to conduct discovery and then to begin live
testimony. 9 3  Testimony was taken from May 1, 2005, through August 7,
2006.94 SoundExchange presented the testimony of fourteen witnesses and
the webcasters collectively presented the testimony of twenty-four
witnesses. 95 The participants filed written rebuttal statements to the live
testimony on September 29, 2006, which was then followed by additional
discovery on the rebuttal evidence.9 6 Rebuttal testimony was taken from
November 6 through November 30, 2006. In all, the Board heard forty-
eight days of testimony, which filled 13,288 pages of transcript. 97  One
hundred and ninety-two exhibits were admitted.98
After the evidentiary phase of the proceedings, the Board ordered
participants to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by
87. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084.




91. Id. (providing that "the parties to the proceeding are: (i) Digital Media Association and certain
of its member companies that participated in this proceeding, namely: America Online, Inc. ("AOL"),
Yahoo!, Inc. ("Yahoo!"), Microsoft, Inc. ("Microsoft"), and Live365, Inc. ("Live365") (collectively
referred to as "DiMA"); (ii) "Radio Broadcasters" (this designation was adopted by the parties):
namely, Bonneville International Corp., Clear Channel Communications, Inc., National Religious
Broadcasters Music License Committee ("NRBMLC"), Susquehanna Radio Corp.; (iii) SBR Creative
Media, Inc. ("SBR") and the "Small Commercial Webcasters" (this designation was adopted by the
parties): namely, AccuRadio, LLC, Digitally Imported, Inc., Radioio.com LLC, Discombobulated,
LLC, 3WK, LLC, Radio Paradise, Inc.; (iv) National Public Radio, Inc. ("NPR"), Corporation for
Public Broadcasting-Qualified Stations ("CPB"), National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial
Music License Committee ("NRBNMLC"), Collegiate Broadcasters, Inc. ("CBI"), Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc., ("IBS"), and Harvard Radio Broadcasting, Inc. ("WHRB")").
92. Id
93. Id; Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d at 754.
94. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084.
95. Id





December 12, 2006, with responses due by December 15, 2006.99 The
Board also ordered the participants to submit stipulated terms.'o However,
no stipulated terms were filed and the proceedings moved into closing
arguments on December 21, 2006.10' Board regulations do not provide for
procedures relating to stipulated terms and the Board did not state why it
asked for such terms. 10 2 In keeping with the willing buyer/willing seller
standard, the Board may have been trying to give the participants one more
opportunity to indicate where they might be in agreement.
The Board issued its final determination on May 1, 2007.'0' The
Board designated per play rates for commercial webcasters that increased
gradually over the five-year covered period. 0 4  All webcasters were
charged an annual minimum fee of $500 to cover administrative costs. 05
For noncommercial webeasters, the $500 minimum fee covered 159,140
aggregate tuning hours (calculated by the total number of hours of
programming multiplied by the number of listeners per hour).10 6 For any
month in which the noncommercial webcasters aggregate tuning hours
exceeded this threshold, they must pay the same per-performance rates as
commercial webcasters for the excess. 10 7  All royalty fees are paid to
SoundExchange to be distributed to the copyright owners. 08
SoundExchange and the copyright owners were perceived by industry
analysts to be the winners of the contest before the Board.'09 The mood of
webcasters was summed up by Joe Kennedy, Chief Executive of Pandora, a
mid-sized webcaster, in his statement that he was "not aware of any
Internet radio service that believes they can sustain a business at the rates
set by [the Board's] decision." 0  The webcasters appealed the
determination to the Court of Appeals as being arbitrary and not supported
by the record of the proceeding."' The court found the $500 minimum fee
to cover SoundExchange's administrative costs for both commercial and
noncommercial webcasters to be arbitrary because there was no evidence in
the record indicating the actual administrative costs of SoundExchange." 2










109. Musser, supra note 40, at 1.
110. Louis Hau, Will Web Radio Get Turned Off?, FORBES.COM, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.
forbes.com/2007/03/06/radio-internet-ruling-tech-cx Ih O307radio.html.
111. Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d at 748.
112. 574 F.3d at 766-67; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2007).
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Other provisions of the determination were affirmed, but the court
remanded the entire determination to the Board for reconsideration."
During the pendency of the Court of Appeals decision, webcasters and
the general public using webcasting services voiced strong feelings about
the fairness of the Copyright Royalty Board determination and provoked a
legislative response. The fundamental concern for legislators was that the
Board's determination would put too many webcasters out of business and
stifle emerging new media technology businesses.' Congress adopted the
Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009 in order bring copyright
owners and copyright users back to the negotiating table."' As a result of
the acts, in January 2009, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting reached
an agreement with SoundExchange." 6  Commercial webcasters and
SoundExchange reached agreement in July 2009.' '17 However,
SoundExchange did not consider its agreed terms to be indicative of fair
market rates, insisting that the Board's determination was appropriate and
fair."8 The agreements differentiated between the distinct webcasting
products, such as pure-play webcasting, simulcasting, and on-demand
performances. 1 9  Other agreements between SoundExchange and
webcasters were reached during the pendency of the Court of Appeals
decisions.120  The specific terms in the various privately negotiated
agreements show an attention to detail not associated with the record
produced during Board proceedings. The record produced by participants
did not distinguish different webcasting products.
113. Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d at 755.
114. Press Release from Rep. Jay Inslee, Internet Radio Bill Passes House (September 28, 2008)
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/wa01_inslee/internet radio bill-passes house.shtml.
115. Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, PL 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (2008), Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2009, PL 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (2009). The laws required SoundExchange to reach agreements
on copyright royalty rates notwithstanding the determination of the Copyright Royalty Board.
116. See, e.g., Rachel Metz, Public Broadcasters Agree to Web Music Royalties, ASSOCIATED
PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE, Jan. 15, 2009.
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V. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE COPYRIGHT
ROYALTY BOARD SYSTEM
A. EFFICIENCY AND EXPERTISE OF THE BOARD
The procedures of the Copyright Royalty Board are neither efficient
nor do they exploit the subject matter expertise that warrant the use of
administrative agencies to supplant private contacting. The Board engages
in formal rulemaking as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act. 12 1
Formal rulemaking, which is analogous to judicial proceedings, has always
been the exception rather than the norm.122 Normally, agencies engage in
informal rulemaking, characterized as notice-and-comment rulemaking. To
satisfy the requirements of informal rulemaking, the agency must publish
notice of the rule in the Federal Register with opportunity for comment by
interested parties and revision by the agency before the final rule is
published.123 This type of procedure is very efficient and allows the agency
to make use of its own expertise in the regulated area. Formal rulemaking,
on the other hand, necessarily involves a full hearing on the record with
interested parties invited to submit evidence and make formal arguments. 124
The most infamous formal rulemaking case is the ten year process of the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to determine what exactly
constitutes "peanut butter." 25 Parties to the rulemaking who believed they
would no longer be able to advertise their products as "peanut butter" after
the final rule, acted to obstruct a final determination. In all, the evidentiary
hearing produced 7,736 pages of testimony, of which only a very small
portion was useful to the FDA.126 Much of the testimony came during
cross-examination in which attorneys asked questions to produce minor
concessions that were more verbal than real.127 As a result, a great amount
of effort was expended to reach a determination that could have been
reached with less formal procedure.
The peanut butter proceeding demonstrates that formal rulemaking is
inherently inefficient when the dispute involves a policy question rather
than a factual determination. Formal hearings and testimony are effective
to elicit facts from the participants that are not easily accessible to agencies
(e.g., when environmental regulators need to know what effect industrial
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557 (2007). The Board is required to make its determination supported
by the formal record created in the proceeding.
122. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING 46 (2d ed. 1991).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2007).
124. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2007).
125. See Robert Hamilton, Rulemaking on the Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50
TEX. L. REV. 1 132, 1143 (1972).
126. Id at 1145-46.
1 2 7. Id
Summer 2011 405
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
waste water temperature has on marine life). However, when the core of
the proceeding is to determine the policy that best serves the statutory
standard and public interest, the benefits of formal rulemaking are
diminished. The facts of the Webcaster II proceeding were easily
ascertainable; the dispute was over how to implement a policy that would
maximize the availability of musical works to the public while ensuring a
fair return to the copyright owners and reflect the rates and terms that
would be agreed to between a willing buyer and willing seller. Informal
rulemaking by notice and comment provides a more efficient procedure by
which to make policy decisions.128 Informal rulemaking would give the
Copyright Royalty Board better ability to control the agenda and define the
focus of the proceeding.' 29 Rather than relying on the parties to produce
the evidence necessary for a final determination, the Board itself would be
able to request the necessary evidence to ensure that it satisfies its public
policy standard. Additionally, the essential reason for the development of
informal rulemaking in administrative actions is that the agencies and
parties under the jurisdiction of those agencies have found that justice can
be realized while saving time and expense by limiting the formal
administrative process."3
The ineffectiveness of the Board is exacerbated because it must rely
on the evidence and arguments submitted by adversarial parties. The
Board does not act as an administrative rate-maker."' The Judges
understand their role to be akin to common law judges presiding over civil
litigation between private parties.' 32 As a result, each participant comes
before the Judges as an adversary attempting to prove that its own proposed
rates and terms best satisfy the statutory standard."' The burden is upon
the parties in the proceeding, and not the Judges, to provide the evidence
for the Judges to make their determination. 13 4 While the Judges may draw
from different rate proposals advanced by the parties, a party's failure to
present evidence necessary to achieve the policy goals of the Act will result
in a poor rate determination.1"
Further, since the Board is making a policy decision, the copyright
owners in Webcaster II, represented by SoundExchange, had a decided
advantage over the multiple copyright users with divergent interests. Even
if the webcasters are able to present their evidence that would enable the
Board to set rates favorable to their industry, webcasters are at a
128. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 122, at 101.
129. See, e.g., id.
130. PETER WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFORMAL PROCESS 57 (1963).
131. Brief for Appellee Copyright Royalty Board at 25, Intercollegiate Broad Sys., 574 F.3d at 754.
132. Id at 27.
133. Id at 25, 26.




disadvantage based upon the interest group theory of politics. During the
creation of public policy, concentrated interest groups have substantially
greater political influence than groups larger in number, but with smaller
per capita stakes, even though the total stakes for the larger group may
significantly exceed that of the smaller."' As a unified voice for copyright
owners, SoundExchange is able to present a more forceful message of its
needs and requirements before the Copyright Royalty Board. Copyright
users, on the other hand, have divergent interests that dilute their message
before the Board.
B. REDUCED INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE NEGOTIATION
Copyright Royalty Judges are required to make rate determinations
that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.137 However, the very nature of the formal administrative proceeding
demonstrates that the parties are not willing buyers and willing sellers."
Were the parties willing buyers and willing sellers, they would have come
to agreement without the presence of the Copyright Royalty Board. The
Judges in Webcaster II recognized that rates for the license, negotiated
under the constraints of a statutory license scheme, do not reflect those that
would arise in the marketplace. 139 In the marketplace, parties that do not
desire to work together are not required to. If they do have interest in
working together, explorations of joint interests may produce better
outcomes. Here, statutory constraints have forced parties into proceedings
before the Board and have constrained the negotiation to the terms of the
Section 114 and Section 112 licenses. As such, the terms that are proffered
by the participants do not reflect the terms of willing buyers and willing
sellers.140
In Webcaster II, the notion that there could be willing buyers and
willing sellers in the webcasting market was impaired by the relative lack
of history for the webcasting marketplace. 14 1 Webcasting became broadly
feasible in 1995 with the release of RealAudio software which allowed for
compressing digital files for Internet transmission while maintaining sound
quality. 142 Only three years later, in 1998, the Digital Millennium
136. NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 55 (1994).
137. 17 U.S.C. 114(f)(2)(B) (2007).
138. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087 (citing Noncommercial Educational
Broadcasting Compulsory License, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,823, 49,835 (Sept 18, 1998)).
139. Id
140. Id.
I41. Kellen Myers, The RIAA, The DMCA, and the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Call for Change
in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 431, 445 (2009).
142. Radio Free Cyberspace, TIME, May 1, 1995.
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Copyright Act established statutory licenses for use of copyrighted material
in webcasts.143  As a result, there was no significant opportunity for a
marketplace of willing buyers and willing sellers to develop.
Webcasters vary significantly in terms of sophistication, economic
resources, business pressures, and a myriad of other factors.144 Smaller
commercial webcasters with limited resources are not in the same
bargaining position as larger commercial webcasters. Noncommercial
webcasters have an entirely different mission for providing content to
listeners than the commercial webcasters. Small commercial webcasters,
large commercial webcasters, and noncommercial webcaster have distinct
interests as copyright users and different conceptions of a fair agreement
with copyright owners. The uncertainty about what is fair in the
webcasting marketplace is also evidenced by SoundExchange's declaration
that its private agreements did not indicate fair market rates.145
The Judges understand their role to be similar to common law judges,
but in practice they act as arbitrators between the copyright owners and
copyright users because they are setting policy based on the proposals
presented by adversarial parties. The Judge's role is further circumscribed
to that of final offer arbitrators who choose the more reasonable proposed
rates at the expense of the opposition.146 In theory, final offer arbitration
will reduce the chilling effect on voluntary negotiation associated with the
availability of conventional third-party arbitration by encouraging
concessions and settlement before submitting the case to the arbitrator.' 47
Final offer arbitration is premised on the belief that parties will settle rather
than submit the case to the arbitrator because of the risk of a total loss by
one party in the arbitration.148  However, empirical evidence has
demonstrated that the premise of final offer arbitration is flawed.149
Instead, the existence of procedures to handle dispute resolution promotes
their use and does not encourage voluntary negotiation.' Further, in
Webcaster II, SoundExchange did not go into the Board proceedings
believing that they would suffer a total loss. SoundExchange had a prior
victory in Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel proceedings.'"' The CARP
143. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
144. Digital Performance Right, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,087.
145. Albanasius, supra note 117.
146. See DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 224 (1981).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Carl Stevens, Is compulsory arbitration compatible with bargaining?, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, v.5 (Feb., 1966)
149. See, e.g., David Dickinson, A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Of/er, and "Combined"
Arbit ration for Dispute Resolution, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 288 (2004).
150. Id at 299.
151. See, e.g., Webcaster 1, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002). Congress felt compelled to reduce
the rates determined by the Librarian of Congress and the CARP with the Small Webcaster Settlement
Act, supra note I 1.
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decisions are not necessarily controlling over the Board, but are considered
for their precedential value.152 The prior victory reduced SoundExchange's
uncertainty about the Boards viewpoint in the Webcaster II proceedings.5
SoundExchange had limited risk in going forward into Board proceedings
rather than reaching a negotiated settlement.
Each side had specific license rate conditions that it was trying to
obtain. Webcasters wanted rates that will allow them to grow and profit or
to deliver quality programming to a larger audience than can be reached by
radio alone. Webcasters are accessible from anywhere in the world and
provide listeners with listening options beyond their local radio.
SoundExchange, on the other hand, has an interest in obtaining maximum
payments for the use of the musical works of its copyright owners.
SoundExchange believes that the Copyright Royalty Board determined
rates are fair and that setting rates below the Board determination acts as a
subsidy to webcasters.154 There was little room to reach an outcome that
satisfied the interests of both sides.' With little room to reach a
satisfactory outcome during voluntary negotiation periods, the availability
of the Copyright Royalty Board as the final determiner of rates encouraged
reliance on its services.15 6
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The statutory scheme of the Copyright Royalty Board created by the
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act produced an ineffective
administrative agency that fails to meet the Act's goal of encouraging
private negotiation. The limited authority of the Copyright Royalty Board
to depart from formal rulemaking and the limited ability to use its own
expertise results in determinations that do not necessarily achieve socially
desirable policy decisions. Private negotiation is not encouraged in this
scheme because the parties do not come to the table as willing buyers and
willing sellers. Instead, each side believes social policy favors its side, and
in the case of SoundExchange, prior precedent from the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels supports this position.
Statutory royalty payments in a dynamic industry sector require a
system in which rates can change as needed in light of changing realities.
The organized nature of copyright owners versus the disparate interests of
copyright users ensures the continued need for a statutory system to deliver
152. H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 27.
153. See, e.g., Craig Olson & Barbara L. Rau, Learning from Interest Arbitration: The Next Round,
50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 237 (1997).
154. Music and Radio: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of John Simson, Executive Director, SoundExchange).
155. RICHARD N. LEBOW, THE ART OF BARGAINING 56 (1996).
156. PRULTT, supra note 146, at 220.
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the policy goals of broad access to the copyrighted materials and fair return
for the copyright owners. Simply giving statutory authority to private
contracts does not satisfy the needs of this dynamic sector. Instead, the
incentives of the Copyright Royalty Distribution and Reform Act have
maintained a system of uncertainty and inefficiency that it sought to do
away. As Congress considers reforms to this statutory scheme or to other
administrative ratemaking systems, Congress must be cognizant of the
effects of improper incentives where the delegated policy makers are
impotent to act.
